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Security & trust

Hyperproxy Security & Trust Center

Review Hyperproxy security boundaries for credential custody, proxy execution, request policy, audit logs, sharing, and assurance status.

Request boundary

  1. Agent or client
  2. Dedicated Hyperproxy proxy
  3. Policy and credential injection
  4. Approved upstream API

Boundary and tenancy

Hyperproxy uses a shared multi-tenant account, billing, and orchestration control plane. Each active subscription receives a dedicated proxy data plane and static IP. No application process or secret store is shared between subscriptions. This describes application and secret-store separation; it is not a claim of exclusive physical hardware.

Key custody

Public control-plane secret APIs are write-only and return secret names and metadata, not values. Stored secret values use AES-256-GCM encryption. Encryption keys are wrapped separately from stored ciphertext, and decryption happens only in the controlled proxy runtime for approved request injection.

Request controls

Auto-Auth replaces configured placeholders at the proxy boundary. Host-scoped bindings limit where a stored credential may be injected. Firewall mode can inspect TLS traffic and evaluate CEL allow, deny, or hold rules; source IP restrictions are an additional option. These controls are policy inputs, not a guarantee that every permitted API operation is safe.

Logs and shares

Access logs record request metadata, policy decisions, and outcome fields without recording secret values. Secure shares are bearer capabilities scoped to a vault, expiry, and use count. Possession can authorize requests until the share expires or is revoked; downstream API authorization and response sensitivity remain the customer’s responsibility.

Assurance status as of September 24, 2026

No public SOC 2 certification, public penetration-test report, uptime SLA, or compliance attestation is claimed as of this review date. This is a status statement, not a roadmap promise. A public subprocessor list requires owner approval. Procurement requests for current evidence can be sent through the contact page.

Current limitations and customer responsibilities

Credential separation reduces direct secret-read exposure; it cannot make an allowed API action safe by itself or prevent a permitted upstream response from containing sensitive data. Customers should use least-privilege upstream credentials, narrow host bindings and rules, protect proxy credentials and share URLs, review logs, and revoke access when it is no longer needed.

Sources